Classical and Connectionist theories of cognitive architecture "explain" systematicity, whereby the capacity for some cognitive behaviors is intrinsically linked to the capacity for others, as a consequence of syntactically and functionally combinatorial representations, respectively. However, both theories depend on ad hoc assumptions to exclude specific architectures-grammars, or Connectionist networks-that do not account for systematicity. By analogy with the Ptolemaic (i.e., geocentric) theory of planetary motion, although either theory can be made to be consistent with the data, both nonetheless fail to explain it (Aizawa, 2003b) . Category theory provides an alternative explanation based on the formal concept of adjunction, which consists of a pair of structure preserving maps, called functors. A functor generalizes the notion of a map between representational states to include a map between state transformations (processes). In a formal sense, systematicity is a necessary consequence of a "higher-order" theory of cognitive architecture, in contrast to the "first-order" theories derived from Classicism or Connectionism. Category theory offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science, analogous to the one that Copernicus provided for astronomy, where representational states are no longer the center of the cognitive universe-replaced by the relationships between the maps that transform them.
Introduction
For more than two decades since Fodor and Pylyshyn's seminal paper on the foundations of a theory of cognitive architecture (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) , the problem of explaining systematicity remains unresolved (Aizawa, 2003b) despite numerous Classicist and Connectionist claims to the contrary (Fodor & McLaughlin, 1990; van Gelder, 1990; Smolensky, 1987) .
The problem of systematicity for a theory of cognition is to explain why the capacity for some cognitive behaviours is intrinsically linked to some other cognitive capacities. The systematicity problem is actually three problems:
1. Systematicity of representation-why is it the case that the capacity to generate some representations (e.g., the representation John loves Mary) is intrinsically linked to the capacity to generate some other representations (e.g., the representation Mary loves John)?
2. Systematicity of inference-why is it the case that the capacity to make some inferences (e.g., that John is the lover in the proposition John loves Mary) is intrinsically linked to the capacity to make some other inferences (e.g., that
Mary is the lover in the proposition Mary loves John)?
3. Compositionality of representation-why is it the case that the capacity for some semantic content (e.g., the thought that John loves Mary, however that thought may be represented) is intrinsically linked to the capacity for some other semantic context (e.g., the thought that Mary loves John, however that thought may also be represented)?
These problems are logically independent-one does not necessarily follow from another (Aizawa, 2003a) , and so a theory is required it explain all three. Classicists and Connectionists employ some form of combinatorial representations to explain systematicity. For Classicists, representations are combined in such a way that tokening of representations of complex entities entails tokening of representations of their constituent entities, so that the syntactic relationships between the constituent representations mirror the semantics ones-systematicity is a result of a combinatorial syntax and semantics (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) . For Connectionists, representations of complex entities are constructed more generally so that their tokening does not necessarily imply tokening constituent entity representations (van Gelder, 1990; Smolensky, 1987) . We refer to the former as classical compositionality, and the latter as functional compositionality.
In general, a Classical or Connectionist architecture can demonstrate systematicity by having the "right" collection of grammatical rules, or functions such that one capacity is indivisibly linked to another. Suppose, for example, a Classical system with the following three production rules:
The capacities to generate all four representations (i.e., John loves John, John loves Mary, etc.) are indivisibly linked, because the presence of all three, or absence of any one of those rules means the system is only capable of generating either all or none of those representations. In no case can the system generate one without being able to generate the other. So, this Classical architecture has the systematicity of representation property with respect to this group of four propositions. Tensor products (Smolensky, 1990 ), or Godel numbers (van Gelder, 1990 are functionally compositional analogues to this explanation. Systematicity of inference follows from having additional processes that are sensitive to the structure of these representations. For Classical architectures, compositionality of representation also follows, because the semantic content of a complex representation is built up from the semantic contents of the constituents and their syntactic relationships (Aizawa, 2003a) . Aizawa (2003a Aizawa ( , 2003b disputes whether a Connectionist architecture can also demonstrate compositionality of representation. Regardless, though, neither Classicism, nor Connectionism can derive theories that provide a full account of systematicity (Aizawa, 2003b) .
A demonstration of systematicity is not an explanation for it. In particular, although grammar G1 has the systematicity of representation property, the following grammar:
This architecture cannot generate a representation of the proposition Mary loves John even though it can generate representations of both John and Mary as agents and patients, and the John loves Mary proposition. The essential problem for Classical theory-likewise Connectionist theory-is that syntactic compositionality by itself is not sufficient without some additional assumptions that admit grammars such as G1 that have the systematicity property, but exclude grammars such as G2 that do not. An explanation for systematicity in these cases turns on the nature of those additional, possibly ad hoc assumptions. Aizawa (2003b) presents an explanatory standard for systematicity and the problem of ad hoc assumptions by analogy with the Ptolemean (geocentric) versus Copernican (heliocentric) explanations for the motions of the planets (see Phillips, 2007 , for a review). The geocentric explanation for planetary motion places the Earth at the center of the other planets' circular orbits. Although this theory can roughly predict planetary position, it fails to predict periods of apparent retrograde motion for the superior planets (i.e. Mars, Jupiter, etc.) across the night sky. To accommodate this data, the geocentric theory was augmented with the assumption that the other planets revolve around points that revolve around the Earth. This additional assumption is ad hoc in that it is unconnected with the rest of the theory and motivated only by the need to fit the data-the assumption could not be confirmed independently of confirming the theory. The heliocentric explanation, having all planets move around the Sun, eschews this ad hoc assumption. Retrograde motion falls out as a natural consequence of the positions of the Earth and other planets relative to the Sun. Tellingly, as more accurate data became available, the geocentric theory had to be further augmented with epicycles on epicycles to account for planetary motion; not so for the heliocentric theory.
Ad hoc assumptions
The problem for Classical and Connectionist theories is that they cannot explain systematicity without recourse to their own ad hoc assumptions (Aizawa, 2003b) . For Classicism, having a combinatorial syntax and semantics does not differentiate between grammars such as G1 and G2. For Connectionism, a common recourse to learning also does not work, whereby systematicity is acquired by adjusting network parameters (e.g., connection weights) to realize some behaviours-training set-while generalizing to others-test set. Learning also requires ad hoc assumptions, because even widely used learning models, such as feedforward (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) and simple recurrent networks (Elman, 1990) , fail to achieve systematicity (Marcus, 1998; Phillips, 2000) when construed as a degree of generalization (Hadley, 1994; Niklasson & Gelder, 1994) . Hence, neither Classical nor Connectionist proposals satisfy the explanatory standard laid out by Aizawa, or Fodor and Pylyshyn for that matter.
Our category-theory based approach addresses the problem of ad hoc assumptions because the concept of an adjunction, which is central to our argument, ensures that the construct we seek (a) exists, and (b) is unique. That is to say, from this core assumption and category theory principles, the systematicity property necessarily follows for the particular cognitive domains of interest, because in each case the one and only collection of cognitive capacities derived from our theory is the systematic collection, without further restriction by additional (ad hoc) assumptions.
Basic category theory
Category theory is a theory of structure par excellence (see Awodey, 2006; Mac Lane, 2000 , for introductions). It was developed out of a need to formalize commonalities between various mathematical structures (Eilenberg & Mac Lane, 1945) , and has been used extensively in computer science for the analysis of computation (see, e.g., Pierce, 1991; Walters, 1991 ). Yet, applications to cognitive psychology have been almost non-existent (but, see Halford & Wilson, 1980; Phillips, Wilson, & Halford, 2009 , for two examples). Our explanation of systematicity with respect to binary relational propositions is based on the concept of an adjunction. In this section, we provide definitions of this and other formal concepts that it depends.
Category
A category C consists of a class of objects |C| = (A, B, . . . ); a set C(A, B) of morphisms (also called arrows, or maps) from A to B where each morphism f : A → B has A as its domain and B as its codomain, including the identity morphism 1 A : A → A for each object A; and a composition operation, denoted "•", of morphisms f : A → B and g : B → C, written g • f : A → C that satisfy the laws of:
The most familiar example of a category is Set, which has sets for objects and functions for morphisms, where the identity morphism 1 A is the identity function and the composition operation is the usual function composition operator "•".
A morphism f : A → B is an isomorphism if there exists a g : B → A, such that g • f = 1 A and f • g = 1 B . In this case, A is said to be isomorphic to B, written A ∼ = B.
Product
A product of two objects A and B in a category C is an object P together with two morphisms p 1 : P → A and p 2 : P → B, such that for any pair of morphisms z 1 : Z → A and z 2 : Z → B, there is a unique morphism u : Z → P, such that the following diagram commutes:
where a broken arrow indicates that there exists exactly one morphism making the diagram commute. That is, the compositions along any two paths with the same start object and the same finish object are the same. So, in this diagram, 
(The → arrow, often read as "maps to", indicates the action of a function on a domain element. Thus f (a) = b is equivalent to f : a → b.) Since u is uniquely determined by z 1 and z 2 , u is often written as z 1 , z 2 , and the diagram used in defining a product then becomes
Functor A functor F : C → D is a structure-preserving map between categories C and D that associates each object A in C to an object F(A) in D; and each map f : A → B in C to a map
A → B and g : B → C for which compositions • C and • D are defined in categories C and D, respectively. The object and arrow components of a functor are sometimes explicitly distinguished as F 0 and F 1 , respectively. Otherwise, the functor component is implicitly identified by its argument. Functor composition and isomorphism are defined analogously to maps (above). That is, the composition of functors F : C → D and G : D → E is the functor G • F : C → E, sending all objects A in C to objects G • F(A) in E; and maps f :
, such that identity and composition are respected. That is, 
Natural transformation
A natural transformation τ : F → G is a structure-preserving map from domain functor F :
, as indicated by the following commutative diagram in the category D:
A natural transformation is a natural isomorphism, or natural equivalence if and only if each τ A is an isomorphism. That is, for each τ A :
. Natural transformations also compose, and the composition of two natural transformations is also a natural transformation.
Adjunction
An adjunction consists of a pair of functors F : C → D, G : D → C and a natural transformation τ : 1 C → (G • F), such that for every C−object X and every C−map f : X → G(Y ) there exists a unique D−map g : F(X) → Y , such that the following diagram commutes:
where the functors are implicitly identified by (co)domain categories C (left subdiagram) and D (right subdiagram). The two functors are called an adjoint pair, (F, G), where F is the left adjoint of G, and G is the right adjoint of F; and natural transformation τ is called the unit of the adjunction.
Category theory explanation: Adjoint functors
We develop our adjoint functors explanation of systematicity in three movements. First, we show that a categorical product provides an account of systematicity of representation and systematicity of inference. However, a product of two objects may afford many isomorphic product objects that do not also account for compositionality of representation. Second, we show that the product functor provides the principled means for constructing only those products that also have the compositionality of representation property. However, there may be more than one product that has the compositionality property, but differs in semantic content by having different syntactic relationships between identical sets of constituents. So, a principled choice is needed to determine the product. Third, we show that the diagonal functor, which is left adjoint to the product functor, provides that principled choice. For concreteness, we refer to the category Set, but our explanation does not depend on this category. First, suppose objects A (say, agents) and B (patients) are sets containing representations of John and Mary, denoted as {J, M}. Although A and B are the same set in this example they may not be in the general case. Since our argument does not depend on equality, we maintain distinct names for generality, and for conceptual clarity. A categorical product of these two sets is the Cartesian product of A and B, which is the set of all pairwise combinations of elements from A and B, together with maps p 1 and p 2 for retrieving the first and second constituent in each case. That is,
By definition, the Cartesian product, A × B, generates all pairwise combinations of elements from A and B, therefore the Cartesian product has the systematicity of representation property. Moreover, by definition, the categorical product, (A × B, p 1 , p 2 ), affords the retrieval of each constituent from each representation (otherwise it is not a product), therefore the categorical product also has the systematicity of inference property. In this case, Z from the categorical product definition takes the role of input, so inferring John as the lover from John loves Mary is just z 1 (JM) = p 1 • u(JM), where JM is the input and u is the input-to-product object map, whose unique existence is guaranteed.
The Cartesian product, however, is not the only product object that satisfies the definition of a categorical product of A and B. An alternative product has P = {1, 2, 3, 4} as the product object, and p 1 : 1 → J, 2 → J, 3 → M, 4 → M and p 2 : 1 → J, 2 → M, 3 → J, 4 → M as the projections. However, this alternative does not have the compositionality of representation property: the semantic contents of these representations, whatever they may be, are not systematically related to each other, or the semantic content of John, or Mary. Hence, categorical products, in themselves, are not sufficient for an explanation of systematicity.
Second, for any category C that has products (i.e. every pair of objects in C has a product), one can define a product functor Π : C × C → C, that is from the Cartesian product of categories, C × C, itself a category, to C, where
In this case, the semantic contents of these elements are systematically related to each other and their constituents John and Mary. This categorical construction is an instance of Classical compositionality, whereby the constituents a i ∈ A, b j ∈ B are tokened wherever the compositions (a i , b j ) ∈ A × B are tokened. As such, it has the compositionality of representation property.
Although the product functor explanation accounts for compositionality of representation, it introduces a new problem: (B × A, p 2 , p 1 ), where p 2 : (b, a) → a and p 1 : (b, a) → b is also a valid product, but the semantic content of (a, b) is not the same as (b, a). That is because they have different order relationships between their constituents even though the corresponding constituents are identical. Thus, a principled choice is required to determine whether, for example, John loves Mary should map to (John, Mary), or (Mary, John). Otherwise, one can define an architecture that does not have the systematicity of inference property by employing both products to correctly infer John as the lover in John loves Mary via (A × B, p 1 , p 2 ), yet incorrectly infer John as the lover in Mary loves John via (B × A, p 2 , p 1 ), where position within the product triple identifies the relevant projection. The assumption that architectures employ only the first product is ad hoc just like the assumption that Classical architectures employ grammars such as G1, but not G2. So, a principled choice is needed to determine the product.
Third, and finally, the left adjoint to the product functor is the diagonal functor ∆ : C → C × C, where ∆ 0 : A → (A, A),
The (diagonal, product) adjoint pair is indicated by the following commutative diagram:
(see Pierce, 1991, Example 2.4.6) . In this manner, the John loves Mary family of cognitive capacities is specified by the commutative diagram
where ag and pt are the agent and patient maps from the set of proposition inputs Pr into the set S ⊇ A ∪ B containing all the possible constituent representations. Given ag, pt as the morphism used by the architecture to map proposition inputs to their corresponding internal representations, then as mentioned (Introduction) the definition of an adjunction guarantees that ag × pt is unique with respect to making Diagram 8 commute. That is, ag×pt
, where JM is the input for proposition John loves Mary. The alternative construction pt × ag is excluded because pt × ag
Having excluded pt × ag by the commutativity property of the adjunction, the only two remaining ways to map the other inputs (i.e., ag, pt and ag × pt • 
This explanation works regardless of whether proposition John loves Mary is represented as (John, Mary) via ag, pt , or (Mary, John) via pt, ag . In the latter case, the adjunction picks out the construction pt × ag, because it is the one and only one that makes the following diagram commute: 
Importantly, the unit of the adjunction, 1 Pr , 1 Pr , is not a free parameter of the explanation; it defines the adjunction. Also, there is no choice in representational format (i.e. left-right, or right-left constituent order)-the given capacity to represent a proposition fixes the same order for all the other propositions. Hence, systematicity is a necessary consequence of this adjoint pair without recourse to additional (ad hoc) assumptions, and so meets the explanatory standard set by Aizawa, and Fodor and Pylyshyn. Explanatory levels: n-category theory A generalization of category theory, called n-category theory (see Leinster, 2003 ) is used to formally contrast our category theory explanation against Classical and Connectionist approaches. Notice that the definitions of functor and natural transformation are very similar. In fact, they are morphisms at different levels of analysis. For n-category theory, a category such as Set is a 1-category, with 0-objects (i.e. sets) for objects and 1-morphisms (i.e. functions) for arrows. A functor is a morphism between categories. The category of categories, Cat, has categories for objects and functors for arrows. Thus, a functor is a 2-morphism between 1-objects (i.e. 1-categories) in a 2-category. A natural transformation is a morphism between functors. The functor category, Fun, has functors for objects and natural transformations for arrows. Thus, a natural transformation is a 3-morphism between 2-objects (i.e. functors) in a 3-category. (A 0-category is just a discrete category, where the only arrows are identities, which are 0-morphisms.) In this way, the order n of the category provides a formal notion of explanatory level.
Classical or Connectionist compositionality is essentially a lower levels attempt to account for systematicity. For the examples we used that level is perhaps best described in terms of a 1-category. Indeed, a context-free grammar defined by a graph is modeled as the free category on that graph containing sets of terminal and non-terminal symbols for objects and productions for morphisms (Walters, 1991) . By contrast, our category theory explanation involves higher levels of analysis, specifically functors and natural transformations, which live in 2-categories and 3-categories, respectively. Of course, one can also develop higher-order grammars that take as input or return as output other grammars. Similarly, one can develop higher-order networks that take as input or return as output other networks. However, the problem is that neither Classical nor Connectionist compositionality delineates those (higher-order) grammars or networks that have the systematicity property from those that do not.
Discussion
In addition to explaining systematicity, our category theory approach has further implications. According to our explanation, systematicity with respect to binary relational propositions requires a category with products. Phillips et al. (2009) also provided a category theory account of the strikingly similar profiles of development for a suite of reasoning abilities that included Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion, among others-all abilities are acquired around the age of five years. The difference between the failures of younger children and the successes of older children (relative to age five) across all these reasoning tasks was explained as their capacity to compute (co)products. (A coproduct is related to a product by arrow reversal-see, e.g., Pierce, 1991 , for a formal definition.) Therefore, our explanation implies that systematicity is not a property of younger children's cognition. Some support for this implication is found on memory tasks that require binding the background context of memorized items (Lloyd, Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009) , though further work is needed to test this implication directly.
Our explanation does not depend on Set, it only requires a category with products. For example, the categories Top of topological spaces and continuous mappings, and Vec of vector spaces and linear mappings (see, e.g., Awodey, 2006) could also be used. These possibilities imply that an explanation of systematicity does not depend on a particular (discrete symbolic, or continuous subsymbolic) representational format. Thus, a further benefit is that our approach opens the way for integration of other (sub/symbolic) levels of analysis.
For reasons of space, we have only sketched our category theory approach to systematicity. More detailed explanation and justification are given in Phillips and Wilson (in prep.) , where we also address other examples of systematicity, such as multiple relations, and relational schemas. In our approach, we have not dealt with domains that are quasisystematic, which appear to be particularly prevalent in language (see Johnson, 2004) . For these cases, we would also need category theory-derived principled restrictions to products. Pullbacks (see Phillips, Wilson, & Halford, 2009 , for an application to cognitive development) are one way to restrict product objects, in the same arrow-theoretic style.
From a category theory perspective, we now see why cognitive science lacked a satisfactory explanation for systematicity-cognitive scientists were working with lowerorder theories in attempting to explain an essentially higherorder property. Category theory offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science, analogous to the one that Copernicus provided for astronomy, where representational states are no longer the center of the cognitive universe-replaced by the relationships between the maps that transform them.
